Natural Logic in Natural Language Inference

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1. Building up to Natural Logic

Monotonicity is the starting point of natural logic. But Natural logic stems specifically from all the problems generated by only looking to monotonicity

- a. Nobody can enter without a valid passport ⊨ Nobody can enter without a passport.
- b. Whiskers is a cat \vDash Whiskers is not a poodle.

But monotonicity does not give us anyway to handle this - it lacks semantic exclusion.

Sánchez Valencia (1991) :

entailment is <u>semantic containment</u> relation \sqsubseteq analogous to the <u>set containment</u> relation \subseteq

2-way entailment:

ENTAILMENT
$$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \langle p, h \rangle \in \mathbf{Dom}_T^2 : p \models h \}$$

NON-ENTAILMENT $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \langle p, h \rangle \in \mathbf{Dom}_T^2 : p \not\models h \}$

3-way entailment

ENTAILMENT
$$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \langle p, h \rangle \in \mathbf{Dom}_T^2 : p \models h \}$$

CONTRADICTION $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \langle p, h \rangle \in \mathbf{Dom}_T^2 : p \models \neg h \}$
COMPATIBILITY $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \langle p, h \rangle \in \mathbf{Dom}_T^2 : p \not\models h \land p \not\models \neg h \}$

Let's cut the cake, and see how these things differ:

	2-way	3-way	containment			
p. X is a couch h. X is a sofa	ENITA IL MENIT		<i>p</i> = <i>h</i>			
p. X is a crow h. X is a bird	ENTAILMENT	ENTAILMENT	$p \sqsubset h$			
p. X is a fish h. X is a carp		COMPATIBLITY	$p \sqsupset h$			
p. X is a hippo h. X is hungry	NON-ENTAILMENT	COMPATIBILITY				
p. X is a cat h. X is a dog		CONTRADICTION	NO-CONTAINMENT			

Best of both worlds:

Problem: A universe U contains $2^{|U|}$ sets, $4^{|U|}$ ordered pairs of sets, and thus $2^{4^{|U|}}$ possible set relations.

We want:

(a) include familiar and useful relations expressing equivalence, containment, and exclusion(b) form a partition of the space of ordered pairs of sets (disjoint cover)

label	definition	meaning
00	$\overline{x} \cap \overline{y}$	in neither x nor y
01	$\overline{x} \cap y$	in y but not x
10	$x \cap \overline{y}$	in x but not y
11	$x \cap y$	in both x and y

For any two p and h: we realize that in a typical Venn diagram there are 4 regions, We take 4 operations, and think about what they might be. We get $2^4 = 16$ cases, drawn below:



In math:

relation	constraint on x	constraint on y	constraint on $\langle x,y\rangle$
R_{0000}	$\emptyset = x = U$	$\emptyset = y = U$	x = y
R_{0001}	$\emptyset \subset x = U$	$\emptyset \subset y = U$	x = y
R_{0010}	$\emptyset \subset x = U$	$\emptyset = y \subset U$	$x \supset y$
R_{0011}	$\emptyset \subset x = U$	$\emptyset \subset y \subset U$	$x \supset y$
R_{0100}	$\emptyset = x \subset U$	$\emptyset \subset y = U$	$x \subset y$
R_{0101}	$\emptyset \subset x \subset U$	$\emptyset \subset y = U$	$x \subset y$
R_{0110}	$\emptyset \subset x \subset U$	$\emptyset \subset y \subset U$	$x\cap y=\emptyset\wedge x\cup y=U$
R_{0111}	$\emptyset \subset x \subset U$	$\emptyset \subset y \subset U$	$x\cap y\neq \emptyset \wedge x\cup y=U$
R_{1000}	$\emptyset = x \subset U$	$\emptyset = y \subset U$	x = y
R_{1001}	$\emptyset \subset x \subset U$	$\emptyset \subset y \subset U$	x = y
R_{1010}	$\emptyset \subset x \subset U$	$\emptyset = y \subset U$	$x \supset y$
R_{1011}	$\emptyset \subset x \subset U$	$\emptyset \subset y \subset U$	$x \supset y$
R_{1100}	$\emptyset = x \subset U$	$\emptyset \subset y \subset U$	$x \subset y$
R_{1101}	$\emptyset \subset x \subset U$	$\emptyset \subset y \subset U$	$x \subset y$
R_{1110}	$\emptyset \subset x \subset U$	$\emptyset \subset y \subset U$	$x\cap y=\emptyset\wedge x\cup y\neq U$
R_{1111}	$\emptyset \subset x \subset U$	$\emptyset \subset y \subset U$	$x\cap y\neq \emptyset \wedge x\cup y\neq U$
			$\ldots \land x \not\subseteq y \land x \not\supseteq y$

But, 16 is still kind of a lot.

Lucky for us, Contradictions and tautologies may be common in logic textbooks, but they are rare in everyday speech.

Examples:

R0000 is an extremely degenerate case: Universe is empty.
Singleton degeneracies:
Relations R0001, R0010, R0100, and R1000 cover the cases and both x and y are either empty or universal.
i.e. X is a female or not. X is a man or not.

9 of these cases are "degenerate cases" due to properties of natural language. The nine relations in R mentioned so far (namely, R0000, R0001, R0010, R0101, R0100, R0101, R1000, R1010, and R1100) are boundary cases in which either x or y is either empty or universal.

So, we get rid of these 9. We are left with 7:

symbol ¹⁰	name	example	set theoretic definition ¹¹	in \mathfrak{R}
$x \equiv y$	equivalence	$\mathit{couch} \equiv \mathit{sofa}$	x = y	R_{1001}
$x \sqsubset y$	forward entailment	$crow \sqsubseteq bird$	$x \subset y$	R_{1101}
$x \sqsupseteq y$	reverse entailment	$Asian \ \Box \ Thai$	$x \supset y$	R_{1011}
$x \land y$	negation	$able \ \land \ unable$	$x\cap y=\emptyset\wedge x\cup y=U$	R_{0110}
$x \mid y$	alternation	$cat \mid dog$	$x\cap y=\emptyset\wedge x\cup y\neq U$	R_{1110}
$x \smile y$	cover	animal \sim non-ape	$x\cap y\neq \emptyset \wedge x\cup y=U$	R_{0111}
$x \ \# \ y$	independence	$hungry \ \# \ hippo$	(all other cases)	R_{1111}

How to convert from Set relations to Entailment relations :

1- Restrict on types

2- x and y belong to relation R1101 iff y holds in every model where x holds (but not vice-versa)

2. Compositional Semantics.

Joins

$$R \bowtie S \stackrel{\text{\tiny def}}{=} \{ \langle x, z \rangle : \exists y \ (\langle x, y \rangle \in R \land \langle y, z \rangle \in S) \}$$

Some joins are clear:

 $\Box \bowtie \Box = \Box$ $\Box \bowtie \Box = \Box$ $\land \bowtie \land = \equiv$ $\forall R \qquad R \bowtie \equiv = R$ $\forall R \qquad \equiv \bowtie R = R$

Not all joins are deterministic:

$x \mid y$	$y \mid z$	x~?~z
$gasoline \mid water$	$water \mid petrol$	$gasoline \equiv petrol$
$pistol \mid knife$	$knife \mid gun$	$pistol \sqsubseteq gun$
$dog \mid cat$	$cat \mid terrier$	$dog \ \square \ terrier$
$rose \mid orchid$	$orchid \mid daisy$	$rose \mid daisy$
$woman \mid frog$	frog Eskimo	woman # Eskimo

So, for now, there is a method for computing joins – both deterministic and not.

3. Compositional Semantics.

If two linguistic expressions differ by a single atomic edit (deletion, insertion, or substitution), then the entailment relation between them depends on two factors:

1. The lexical entailment relation generated by the edit;

$$\beta(x, e(x)) = \beta(e) = X$$

2. How this lexical entailment relation is affected by <u>semantic composition</u> with the remainder of the expression (the context). Projectivity

$$\beta(x, y) = Y$$

$$\beta(f(x), f(y)) = ?$$

Note: assumption: tense and aspect matter little in inference

3. A. Entailment Relations: Substitution, Deletion, Insertion

Basic example:

x = red car e = sub(car, convertible)Then $\beta(e) = \square$ (because convertible is a hyponym of car).

If e = del(red), then $\beta(e) = \Box$ (because red is an intersective modifier).

Substitutions of open-class terms

Synonyms :	\equiv relation (sofa \equiv couch, happy \equiv glad, forbid \equiv prohibit);
hyponym-hypernym pairs :	\sqsubset relation (crow \sqsubseteq bird, frigid \sqsubset cold, soar \sqsubset rise);
antonyms :	relation (hot cold, rise fall, advocate opponent).

Example:

a = unmarried man b = bachelor

$$\beta(sub(a,b)) = \equiv$$

Mostly use WordNet for Synonomy, hyponymy, antonymy, etc.

Substitutions of closed-class terms

Generalized Quantifiers: "Some", "All",

i.e. "every" entails "some" I have four children ⊏ I have two children I have four children | I have two children

Generic deletions and insertions

Generally governed by Monotonicity Example: car which has been parked outside since last week \sqsubset car

Special deletions and insertions

Factives vs implicatives

Implicatives:

Remember To: Two-way Implicative ++|--Remember That: Factive

a. She remembered to lock the door. ENTAILS. She locked the door.

b. She did **not** remember to lock the door. ENTAILS. She did **not** lock the door.

c. She remembered that she locked the door. PRESUPPOSES. She locked the door.

d. She did **not** remember that she locked the door. PRESUPPOSES. She locked the door

Unfortunately – the process for determining factive vs implicative is not straightforward: <u>"The sobering finding of this study</u> that we are now in the progress of replicating with a more careful experimental design suggests that some very basic inferences such as whether the <u>event</u> described by an infinitival complement <u>happened</u> or not depend on opinions that <u>are not</u> <u>part of the literal meaning of the sentence</u>. This is a difficult problem for compositional semantics and for Natural Logic as well" – Kartunnen (2015)

Non-subsective adjectives

i.e. fake, former, and alleged. T

deleting fake or former seems to generate the | relation (fake diamond | diamond)

deleting alleged seems to generate the # relation (alleged spy # spy).



3. B. Semantic Composition : Lexical Edits: Projections

Projection - through Monotonicity: what we know already

Nobody can enter without pants – (nobody(can((without pants) enter)) Pants ⊏ Clothes Without : ↓ Without↓ pants ⊐ Without clothes Can : ↑ can↑ (without pants) enter ⊐ can (without clothes) enter Nobody : ↓

Nobody \downarrow (can \uparrow (without \downarrow pants) enter) \sqsubset Nobody(can(without clothes) enter)

Projection – generalized from monotonicity

 $\beta(x, y) \in \{entailment \ relations\}\$ $f \in \{connectives\}\$ $\beta(f(x), f(y)) = ? \in \{entailment \ relations\}\$

In theory, for each f there are 7^7 (823,543) possible entailment projections signatures:

≡			^		_	#
•	п	C	П	Б	Б	C
A	В	C	D	E	Г	G

Let's look at projectivity of logical connectives:

			pro	jecti	vity		
connective	≡			^		\smile	#
negation (not)	≡			۸	\smile		#
conjunction (and) / intersection	≡					#	#
disjunction (or)	≡			\smile	#	\smile	#
conditional (if) (antecedent)	≡			#	#	#	#
conditional (if) (consequent)	≡					#	#
biconditional $(if and only if)$	≡	#	#	^	#	#	#

Projectivity of quantifiers:

	projectivity for 1 st argument				pre	ojecti	vity	for 2	nd ar	gume	ent			
quantifier	≡			^		\smile	#	≡		\square	^		\smile	#
some	≡			<u>_</u> †	#	\smile^{\dagger}	#	≡			\bigcirc^{\dagger}	#	\bigcirc^{\dagger}	#
no	≡			†	#	†	#	≡			†	#	†	#
every	≡			‡	#	‡	#	≡			†	†	#	#
not every	≡			\smile^{\ddagger}	#	\smile^{\ddagger}	#	≡			\smile^{\dagger}	\smile^{\dagger}	#	#
$at\ least\ two$	≡			#	#	#	#	≡		\square	#	#	#	#
most	≡	#	#	#	#	#	#	≡		\square			#	#
exactly one	≡	#	#	#	#	#	#	≡	#	#	#	#	#	#
$all \ but \ one$	≡	#	#	#	#	#	#	≡	#	#	#	#	#	#

Example: most people were early | most people were late. most fish talk # most birds talk

So... Notice a lot of #

Some caveats are in order.

Certain approximations have been made (except in the case of negation, which is exact).

<u>The projection of a given entailment relation can depend on the value of the other argument to the function</u>. That is, if we are given B(x; y), and we are trying to determine its projection B(f(x, z); f(y, z)), the answer can depend not only on the properties of f, but also on the properties of z.

x = French man y = European man z = Parisian

4. Putting it all together : NatLog - ALGORITHM

- 1. Find a sequence of atomic edits $\langle e_1, ..., e_n \rangle$ which transforms p into h: h= $(e_n \circ ... \circ e_1) \circ p$ Let us say that $x_i = e_i \circ x_{i-1}$
- 2. For each e_i
 - a. Determine the lexical entailment relation $\beta(e_i) = \beta(x_{i-1}, e_i(x_{i-1}))$
 - b. Find the entailment relation $\beta(x_{i+1}, x_i) \forall i$
- 3. Join atomic entailment relations across the sequence of edits, as in section 5.6: $B(p,h) = B(x_0, x_n) = B(x_0, e_1) \bowtie \cdots \bowtie B(x_{i-1}, e_i) \bowtie \cdots \bowtie B(x_{n-1}, e_n)$

System	Р %	R %	Acc $\%$
baseline: most common class	55.7	100.0	55.7
bag of words	59.7	87.2	57.4
NatLog 2007	68.9	60.8	59.6
NatLog 2008	89.3	65.7	70.5

Table 7.3: Performance of various systems on 183 single-premise FraCaS problems (three-way classification). The columns show precision and recall for the YES class, and accuracy.

References:

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